Government
of the Phil. Islands v. HSBC, G.R. No. 44257, 22 November 1938
Facts:
The
appellees are banks doing business in the Philippines. This has been brought
about by the appellant to determine the
liability of the appellees under section 11 of Act No. 4007. All the appellees
demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Deeming the statutory provision
relied upon by the appellant was unconstitutional. The National City Bank of
New York alleged further, in support of the demurrer filed by it, that there
was a misjoinder of parties defendant, and that section 11 of Act No. 4007 did
not impose any tax upon national banking associations, in which class it belonged.
The court below sustained the demurrers filed by the appellees, on the sole
ground that the complaint did not allege a cause of action, because the
statutory provision involved was unconstitutional.
It questions now the
constitutionality of section 11 of Act No. 4007, which reads as follows:
"Sec.
11. The provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, the total
annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking shall be reimbursed annually to the
Government by assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to
inspection by the Bank Commissioner. The proportion of expenses of the Bureau
of Banking to be assessed against each such banking institution shall be the
same as the proportion which its average total assets bear to the average total
assets of all such banking institutions during the year in which the expenses
were incurred."
Appellees
withstand that the subject matter in
this section is not embraced in the title of the Act, in violation of section 3
of the Jones Law which provides, among other things: "That no bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This provision is similar to
those found in the constitutions of most of the Stales of the Union. It has
been said that the purpose of such a provision is to prevent the evils of
so-called "omnibus bills" and surreptitious or unconsidered
legislation. "The mischief sought to be remedied by the requirement of a
single subject or object of legislation was the practice of bringing together
in one bill matters having no necessary or proper connection with each other
but often entirely unrelated and even incongruous. By the practice of
incorporating in proposed legislation of a meritorious character provisions not
deserving of general favor but which, standing alone and on their own merits,
were likely to be rejected, measures which could not have been carried without
such a device and which were sometimes of a pernicious character were often
incorporated in the laws; for, to secure needed and desirable legislation,
members of the legislature were, by this means, often induced to sanction and
actually vote for provisions which, if presented as independent subjects of
legislation, would not have received their support. It was also the practice to
include in the same bill wholly unrelated provisions, with the view of
combining in favor of the bill the supporters of each, and thus securing the
passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed on its own merits.
To do away with this hodge podge or 'log rolling' legislation was one, and
perhaps the primary, object of these constitutional provisions. Another abuse
that developed in legislative bodies was the practice of enacting laws under
false and misleading titles, thereby concealing from the members of the
legislature, and from the people, the true nature of the laws so enacted. It is
to prevent surreptitious legislation in this manner that the subject or object
of a law is required to be stated in the title. While the objects of these
constitutional provisions are variously stated, the authorities are agreed that
they were adopted to remedy these and similar abuses. The purposes of these
constitutional provisions have been summarized as follows: (1) to prevent 'log
rolling' legislation; (2) to prevent surprise, or fraud, in the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation; and (3) to
apprise the people of the subject of legislation under consideration." (25
R. C. L., pp. 834-836.)
The
title of Act No. 4007 is: "An Act to reorganize the departments, bureaus
and offices of the Insular Government, and for other purposes." At the
time of the passage of this Act, the Bureau of Banking was already in existence
as one of the bureaus of the Insular Government. (Act No. 3519.) It seems clear
therefore that that bureau is embraced in that title. On the other hand, the
contents of section 11 are germane to and connected with the organization and
maintenance of said bureau.
Issue:
Whether or not section 11 of Act No.
4007 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 11 of Act No. 4007 is constitutional.
It does not, however, apply to the appellee, the National City Bank of New
York. The National City Bank of New York, being an agency of the United States,
was not subject to taxation by the Philippine Government except as permitted by
Act of Congress. The form of taxation imposed under section 11 of Act No. 4007
was not permitted by any act of Congress. (Posadas vs. National City Bank, 296
U. S., 497; 80 Law. ed., 351.)
Eugenio
v. Drilon, G.R. No. 109404, 22 January 1996
Facts:
On
May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on instalment basis from petitioner
and co-owner Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon
City.
Acting
on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620
filed by the Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing
Authority rendered a resolution on inter alia ordering petitioner to cease and
desist from making further sales of lots in the said village or in any project
owned by him.
While
NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with
the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against
petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and
Adelina
Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment
of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the
said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered.
Private respondent further alleged that he suspended his payments because of
petitioner's failure to develop the village. Private respondent prayed for the
annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to
him.
Sometime
later, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to
cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondent's
complaint. On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and,
applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development
and to reinstate private respondent's purchase contract over one lot, and to
immediately refund to the complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all
payments made thereon, plus interests computed... at legal rates from date of receipt
hereof until fully paid. The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal,
affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Secretary
Drilon showed a grave abuse in discretion when he applied P.D. 957 and
concluded that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified
private respondent's non-payment of his amortizations.
Ruling:
No.
There was no show of grave abuse in
discretion when he applied P.D. 957. The intent of the law, as culled from its
preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to
remedy, must be enforced. as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts
in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by
private respondent when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner
due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the
following matters: although private respondent started to default on amortization
payments beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he had already
incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the
petitioner, who had the cancellation option available to him under the
contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion but delayed
until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by
that time the land purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the
provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12, 1976.
Antonio
v. Miranda, G.R. No. 135869, 22 September 1999
Facts:
The parties involved in this case
were rival candidates for Punong Barangay of Brgy. Ilaya, Las Pinas City, Metro
Manila. After the Board of Canvassers proclaimed that appellant Rustico Antonio
had won, appellee Vicente Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest Election
Protest Case No. 97-0017 against Antonio before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Las Pinas City.
On March 9, 1998, the Trial Court
rendered a decision which Antonio admitted that he received on 18 March 1998. Subsequently, Antonio filed
a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 27 March 19985 or nine days after
receipt thereof. Meanwhile Miranda moved to execute the decision of the trial
court, the court denied the motion for execution.
Antonio, on 10 August 1998, received
from COMELEC an order which stated that he failed the petition because it
lapsed the five-day period allowable to issue an appeal. He contended that he
followed R.A. 6679 and the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC contended that
Section 21 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure should be followed
which was five days upon receipt of the order.
Issue:
Whether or not the period to appeal
a decision of a municipal trial court to the COMELEC in an election protest involving
a barangay position be 5 days as per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or ten days as
provided for in R.A. 6679 and the Omnibus Election Code.
Ruling:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure in
Rule 37 Section 21 which states that an appeal should be within five days upon
receipt of the decision should be followed. It is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. The present appeal should be dismissed. In the case at bar,
Antonio filed his notice before the trial court nine days upon receipt of the
decision appealed from or four days after the prescribed five day period. The
failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period as required by the
rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precludes
the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
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